No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/11/22 : LOC-HAK-448-1-18-4

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ACTION

TOP SECRET/CODEWORD ATTACHED

111 May 28, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

NSS Review Completed.

MORI C05075471

FROM:

John H. Holdridge

SUBJECT:

CIA Estimate of Chinese Intentions in Indochina

CIA has prepared an estimate as to what the Chinese may do in Indochina, at our request.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the attached memorandum to the President.

Attachment

TOP SECRET/CODEWORD ATTACHED
JHH: LG:mlr:5/28/70

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2011/11/22 : LOC-HAK-448-1-18-4

Not fint

INFORMATION

TOP SECRET/CODEWORD ATTACHED

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT:

CIA Estimate of Chinese Intentions in Indochina

There have been recurrent rumors, some of them probably inspired by Hanoi, that Chinese troops either are or will soon be engaged in Laos and Cambodia.

At our request, CIA has prepared an estimate of the possibility of deeper Chinese involvement in Indochina (Tab A).

The CIA estimate, with which I agree, is that the Chinese will not change their present cautious policy of encouraging and aiding the North Vistnamese while they carefully keep out of the line of fire. The estimate discounts the rumors of a Chinese presence, aside from the 8,000-10,000 engineer troops in North Vietnam and AAA, security and road-building forces of some 10,000-14,000 in northwestern Laos. Chinese military dispositions near the border areas are defensive in nature, and the trend has been to thin out the border forces, if anything.

The continuing willingness of Hanoi to pursue a policy of protracted war, plus the fortunate accident that placed Sihanouk in their hands, both serve Peking's strategy and aid it in competition with the Soviets for influence over Communist movements in Southeast Asia. Peking probably does not believe that our entry into Cambodia has imperiled Hanoi's ability to maintain its policy and continue the war. Under this combination of circumstances, Peking must believe that things are going rather well and that it has little reason to change its policies.

Attachment

TOP SECRET/CODEWORD ATTACHED

JHH: LG:mlr:5/28/70